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DECISIONS UPON THE RULE IN TWYNE'S CASE SINCE

1866.

THE subject of fraudulent conveyances was reviewed and the
decisions in the various states carefully collated by Mr. WALLACE,
in the note to Twyne's Case, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. It may prove of
value to examine the later cases on this subject, decided within
the past fifteen years, and note such changes as may have taken place
within that time. The cases have all resolved themselves pretty
generally into two classes.
1. Where retention of possession by the vendor or mortgagor
is deemed fraudulent in law, per 8e, and, 2. Where retention of
possession is pima facie fraud, but open to explanation, the force
of which it is for the jury to decide.
In the first class many cases are governed by strictly construed.
statutes, passed with the object apparently of counteracting the
tendency on the part of the courts to a relaxation of the rule in
Twyne's Case. Of all these, California enforces the principle of
fraud per se as rigidly as it is anywhere found. In Woods v. Bugbey,
29 Cal. 466 (1866), the rule is laid down. This was an action
against the sheriff for damages, for seizing and taking in execution
a brick-kiln, as the property of one O'Neill, which the plaintiff
claimed as his by virtue of a sale. It was in evidence that*no
change of possession had taken place, but it was also found as a
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matter of fact that the transaction was bona fide and free from
actual fraud. The statute of California; is as follows: "Every
sale made by a vendor of goods and chattels in his possession, or
under his control, and every assignment of goods and chattels,
unless the same be accompanied by an immediate delivery and be
followed by an actual and continued change of possession of the things
sold or assigned, shall be conclusive evidence of fraud as against
the creditors of the vendor or the creditors of the person making
such assignment or subsequent purchasers in good faith ;" and
sec. 17, "No mortgage of personal property hereafter made shall
be valid against any -other persons than the parties thereto, unless
possession of the mortgaged property be delivered to and retained
by the mortgagee" (Laws 1850, p. 267). CURimY, J., delivering
the opinion of the Supreme Court, says, that "the kind of possession which it was necessary for the mortgagee to have of the
mortgaged property, to place it beyond the reach of the creditors
of the mortgagor, was an actual possession. * * * What constitutes
an actual and continued change of possession is well stated in
Sevens v. Irwin, 15 Cal. 506, and in Godchauz v. Muford, 26
Cal. 323," and quoting the opinion in Lay v. NDevile, 25 Id. 552,
the court there say, "It was intended that the vendee should
immediately take and continuously hold the possession of the goods
purchased, in the manner and accompanied with such plain and
unmistakabld acts of possession, control and ownership as a prudent
bona fide purchaser would do in the exercise of his rights over the
property, so that all persons might have notice that he owned and
had possession of the property." After further discussion, CURREY,
J., said, "We think the case clearly within the mischiefs to prevent which the statute was passed, and that judgment ought to have
been for the defendant instead of the plaintiff." There was a
petition for a rehearing, and upon that the same judge delivered
the opinion, in which he re-asserted his former position with greater
vigor, making a comparison between the statutes and decisions of
New York and other states and those of California, and concluding,
"No excuse or explanation for want of an actual and continued
change of possession can be entertained, and it is quite useless to
cite decisions made under the statutes of Elizabeth, and of New York,
or other states, allowing the want of an immediate delivery and an
actual and continued change of possession to be explained or
accounted for, as authoritative expositions of the, rule which our
statute has prescribed." See also as to what constitutes sufficient

WITHOUT DELIVERY OF POSSESSION.

change of possession: -ord v. Chambers, 28 Id. 13, and 1egli v.
MeOure, 47 Id. 612.
Connecticut. In Osbornev. Tuller, 14 Conn. 529, all of the preceding cases were reviewed, and the note to Twyne's Case finds
the result of the decisions to be that "the rule is one of policy
and not of intention; that it is not enough that the jury find
that the sale was bona fide and for a full consideration; though
evidence of that is proper to be submitted to the jury to repel
actual fraud, there must be shown some reason for the retention
legally sufficient and satisfactory; the presumption of fraud is a
presumption of law, and the law judges of the cases in which it
does not arise, and the jury are to be instructed by the court as
to the sufficiency of the facts, and reasons alleged to justify the
retention." Lake v. Morris, 30 Conn. 201. "There is no rule,
however, which enables a court to say, from one or more particular acts
of intermeddling with property by the vendor after a sale, that they
amount to the retention of the possession of it, so as to render the
sale void as against creditors. The fact of such possession is indeed
conclusive evidence of a colorable sale. But whether in fact there
has been such a retention of possession must always be a question
for the jury." The rule was stated more stringently in Webster v.
Peck, 31 Conn.495. In NYorton v. -Doolittle,32 Id. 405, upon the
point reserved for the court, it was held that there being a restoration of possession after a formal delivery, the sale was void, although the bona fides was not doubted, BUTLER, J., saying: "The
policy which dictates it, and the prevention at which it aims, require its rigid application to every case where there has not been
an actual, visible and continued change of possession:" affirmed in
Hall v. aaylor, 37 Conn. 550 (1871), and Hatstatv. Blakeslee, 41
Id. 301 (1874). Mortgages not made in accordance with the requirements of the statute are void, where there is a retention of
possession by the mortgagor, not only as against attaching creditors,
but an assignee in insolvency: aaylorv. H1arding, 37 Conn. 508.
But an executory contract, under which the vendee is allowed to
have possession, with an agreement that the title shall not pass until
the payment of a certain sum at a fixed time, will be sustained
against the creditors of the vendee: Hughes v. Kelly, 40 Conn. 148.
In Delaware one case has recently been brought in the Superior
Court, Fall Session, 1871, Taylor v. Richardson, 4 Houst. 300, in
which GILpni, C. J., charged the jury that to entitle the plaintiff
in an action of replevin to recover the goods, which happened tobe
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machinery, they "must be satisfied that there was an actual sale of
them by Scott to him, and that it was not a pretended sale merely,
for the purpose of preventing his creditors from seizing them for the
payment of his debts; and that they were delivered to him in a reasonable and convenient time after such actual sale to him; that is to
say, as soon as it could conveniently have been done under the circumstances, with the exercise of due and proper diligence and
attention on his part for, that purpose. * * * And if they
were satisfied on both those points that su-.h was the case, their
verdict should be for the plaintiff, but if not, for the defendant ;"
a charge which seems entirely in accord with the Delaware statute,
which enacts that the sale shall be void except as against the
vendor, unless there shall be an actual delivery "as soon as conveniently may be after the making of such sale."
In Florida the only case reported within the past ten years
appears to be Smith and Wife v. William ffinos, 10 Fla. 258, in
which it was held that fraud might be inferrea from the circumstances, as, whether the vendor keeps the bill of sale or retains possession of the goods or any part of them.
Illinois maintains pretty closely the rule of ten years ago:
Ticknerv. McClelland, 84 Ill. 471; Allen v. Carr,85 Id. 388. It
has been held that if deliVery has been made to the vendee upon
secret conditions they cannot bind a bona fide purchaser: W. U
Railroad Co. v. Wagner, 65 Ill. 197; Young v. Bradley, 68 Id.
553. And although it is necessary as matter of law that there
shall be an actual change of possession, it is not necessary to a
complete transfer that the vendee should remain in possession. If,
after the delivery to the purchaser, he subsequently returned it to
the vendor, it may be a circumstance tending to show only a colorable transaction, more or less cogent, according to the circumstances. But it certainly may be explained: Tright v. Grover,
27 Ill. 426. If a mortgagor of horses keep them in his possession,
the mortgage is bad as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser or
mortgagee: McCormick v. Hadden, 37 Ill. 370, and if possession
remain with the mortgagor after maturity creditors are not bound:
Hanford v. Obrecht, 49 Ill. 146 ; Lemen v. Robinson, 59 Id. 115.
But retention of possession after a judicial sale does not render it
void: Hanford v Obrecht, supra. Under the revised statutes a
loan of personal property is good for five years: Peters v. Smith,
42 Ill. 417.
Iowa seems not to have been ncticed in the note to Twyne's
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Case. The code of Iowa provides that as against existing creditors a sale of chattels, where the vendor remains in possession,
is invalid, unless a written instrument conveying the same is
duly executed, acknowledged and filed of record. This act has
been strictly construed, and where there was no record it has
been held void: .Prather Parrv. Parker, 24 Ia. 26. It seems
from a very recent case that possession alone constitutes fraud,
unless the act has been complied with, and that the bona fides of
the transaction does not affect subsequent creditors: Boothby & Co.
v. Brown, 40 Ia. 104. "If, therefore, the property be left with
the seller, whose relations to it continue unchanged so far as the
world may know by the acts of the parties, the possession will be
regarded as continuing in him :" BEcK, J., Tb. But where one
becomes a creditor subsequent to a mortgage, and after notice
of the same, the mortgage is good against him, upon the theory
which prevails in all cases under the recording acts, that recording is merely constructive notice, and intended to take the place of
actual notice: ITefavran v. Haupt, 9 Ia. 83. It has been expressly
held that possession may be retained where the terms of the act
*have been complied with: -Kuhnv. Graves, 9 Ia. 303. But even
under a recorded bill of sale, if anything remains to complete the
sale, as to fix the quantity or price, as in the case of the sale of
growing crops, it is void as against a subsequent execution: Snyder
v. Tibbals, 82 Ia. 447. And when there has been no recorded
instrument, but the price paid and property left with the vendor to
finish, as in the case of a buggy, such possession is fraudulent in
law against a bonafide mortgage: ifesser & Hale v. Wilson, 86 Ia.
152.
In Kentucky, it was said by HARDIN, J., in Morton v. .Ragan
fDickey, 5 Bush 384 (1869), "The principle is well, settled, as
applicable to private sales of movable property, that the possession
must accompany the title, or the sale will be.per se fraudulent and
void in law as to subsequent purchasers and creditors of the vendor,
even though the contract contains a stipulation that the seller is to
retain the possession until a future. day: Brummel v. Stockton, 3
Dana 135; Bobbins v. Oldham, 1 Duvall 28." But the same case
held that the rule did not apply to property not liable to execution.
Where the property is not identified as a sale of so many of a number of barrels of whiskey in a bonded warehouse, no title passes as
against an execution: M1fay v. ifoaglan, 9 Bush 171. Secret conditions that title shall not vest in the vendee until payment of the
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purchase-money, are void as against subsequent creditors or purchasers of the vendee: Vaughn v. ifopson, 10 Bush. 337. See
also Greer v. Ckurch J' Co., 13 Id. 430.
, In Maryland, which was originally classed among the states holding retention of possession, in case of sales, fraudulent in law, no
change seems to have taken place. In ifreuzer v. Cooney, 45 Md.
582, it was held that the recording of a bill of sale, as required by
the code, was equivalent to transfer of possession. Thompson et al.
v. Baltimore J. Ohio Railroad Co., 28 Md. 396, is an interesting
case, in which it was said that constructive delivery of iron was
sufficient to pass the title; but it was held, that the vendor's lien
was not thereby lost in case of the vendee's insolvency.
In Missouri, the law has undergone several changes. In the
earlier cases, as was said in the note to Twyne's Case, the principle
of that case was closely followed; but subsequent decisions tending
to make the question one of bona fides, somewhat unsettled the
rule, until the statute of 1855 practically declared the law to be as
pronounced in Shepherd v. Trigg, 7 Mo. 151. But in 1865 a new
law was passed, changing the original act by the insertion of a
section which declared that "every sale made by a vendor of goods
and chattels in his possession or under his control, unless the same
be accompanied by delivery in a reasonable time (regard being had
to the situation of the property), and be followed by actual and
continued change of the possession of the things sold, shall be held
to be fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the vendor or
subsequent purchasers in good faith :" Wagner's (Mo.) Statutes
281, § 10. This, as was said by WAGNER, J., in C0aflin v. _osenberg, 42 Mo. 439 (1868), cited in Allen v. HAassey, 17 Wall.
351, practically unsettled the law of the previous twenty years and
restored the ancient rule; and under this statute it has been uniformly held that the bona fides of the transaction need not be
determined by the jury, unless they first find that there has been
some open, notorious or visible act, clearly and unequivocally
indicative of delivery and possession, and that not a joint or concurrent possession: Lesem v. Herriford, 44 .Mo. 323; Bishop v.
O'Connell, 56 Id. 158; Burgert v. Borchert, 59 Id. 80 (1875).
What is a "reasonable time" must be determined by the circumstances of each case: Bishop v. O'Connell, supra. Nor will a
bonafide purchaser from the vendee stand in any better position
than the original vendee: Lesem v. H~erriford, supra. It seems
to be settled that, under the statute, in case of chattel mortgages,
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either possession or recording is essential: Bevans v. Bolton, 31
Mo. 437.
In Pennsylvania, Olow v. Wood, the leading case up to 1855,
was recognised as the highest authority in 1870 by SIIARSWOOD,
J., in Mceibbin v. Martin, 14 P. F. Smith 356. " low v. Wood,
5 S. & R. 275, decided by this court in 1819, is the magna
charta of our law upon this subject. * * * It established that
retention of possession was fraud in law wherever the subject
of the transfer was capable of delivery, and no honest and fair
reason could be assigned for the vendor not giving. up and the
vendee taking possession. * * * Whenever the subject of
the sale is capable of an actual delivery, such delivery must
accompany and follow the sale to render it valid against creditors. The court is the tribunal to judge whether there is sufficient
evidence to justify the inference of such a delivery." This case
decided that where there was actual delivery it was a question
of fact for the jury whether all that was necessary had been
done, or whether there was any deception practised in effecting
the change. Vide, also, Bentz v. .Rockey, 19 P. F. Smith 71.
The character of the property and the circumstances of the transfer will be taken into consideration by the court, and- the jury will
be allowed to judge whether all that was necessary to be done has
been done- Hfaynes v. iunsicker, 2 Casey 58; Dunlap v. Bournonville, Id. 72; Barr v. Beitz, 3 P. F. Smith 256; Long v.
Knapp, 4 Id. 514 ; Billingsley v. White, 9 Id. 464 ; Mcarlan v. Bnglish, 24 Id. 296; Bond v. Bronson, 30 Id. 360; Sheldow v. Sharpless, 2 W. N. C. 311. The strict rule is not without
its exceptions. A bona fide sale of goods in the hands of a bailee
by the vendor is good against the vendor's creditors, unless the
vendor re-take possession before the vendee: Worman v. Kramer,
23 P. F. Smith 378; Woods v. Hul, 1 W. N. C.442. The transfer
must be actual, continuing and exclusive in the vendee; concurrent possession is evidence of fraud: Miller v. Garman, 19 P. F.
Smith 134; Brawn v. Keller, 7 Wright 104; &eelwagon v. Jeffries, 8 Id. 407; Jewart v. Clement, 12 Id. 413; Garman v.
Cooper, 22 P. F. Smith 32; Worman v. Kramer, supra; NeHarlanv. English, supra.
Where from the nature of the case exclusive possession is impossible, e. g., a post-nuptial settlement by a husband upon his wife,
concurrent possession is not fraudulent: Larkin v. McMullin, 13
Wright 29. Assignments recorded within the thirty days allowed
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for recording are not within the principle of Twyqne's Case : .Dallam
v. _ider, 6 W. & S. 323, approved in Whitney's Appeal, 10 Harris 505 ; ffeckman v. Messinger, 13 Wright 473 ; Marks's Appeal,
4 Norris 231.
The distinction drawn in Lehigh Co. v. .Field, 8 W. & S. 232,
between conditional sales and bailments, as evidenced by Martin
214, and that case, has been maintained, notv. Mathiot, 14 S. & ]R1.
withstanding the editor's note to the contrary in Smith's 'Leading
Cases. Delivery of possession, with a reservation that the vendor
may recover possession upon failure to pay all of the purchasemoney, or with a lien reserved by.the vendor, is fraudulent as
against creditors of the vendee or bona fide purchasers from him:
Haak v. Linderman, 14 P. F. Smith 499; Waldron v. Haupt, 2
Id. 408; -Euwer, Assignee, &c., v. Van Giesen et al., 6 W. N.
C. 363. Bailments, where the right of possession is not parted
with, and no actual sale has taken place, but only an agreement
to sell at a future time, are not fraudulent in law: Chamberlain v. Smith, 8 Wright 431; Rowe v. Sharp, 1 P. F. Smith 26;
Becker v. Smith, 9 Id. 469. If the vendee allows the vendor to
remain in possession, or after delivery immediately gives him possession, and the vendor sells to a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice, the purchaser can hold the gobds. It is held that
this is common law and not dependent upon the statute: Shaw v.
Levy, 17 S. & R. 99; Davis v. Bigler, 12 P. F. Smith 242:
Per SHARSwOOD, J.
But "retention of possession by the former owner of a chattel
sold at sheriff's sale, is not an index of fraud, because the sale is
not the act of the persons retaining, but of the law; and because
a judicial sale, being conducted by the sworn officer of the law,
shall be deemed fair till it is proved tobe otherwise. * * * A chattel thus purchased, then, may safely be left in the possession of the
former owner on any contract of bailment the law allows in any
other cases :" Myers v. Harvey, 2 Penn. 478; Craig's Appeal,
27 P. F. Smith 448.
In Coble v. Nonemaker, 28 P. V. Smith 501, it is said that a
chattel mortgage without change of possession is void as to creditors, but the decision was that a purchaser with notice could not
take advantage of the defect. See also Euwer v. Van GCiesen,
supra. By the Act of May 18th 1876, P. L. 181, mortgages in
writing and duly acknowledged, for any sum not less than $500,
upon lumber, iron and coal oil in bulk, iron tanks, tank cars, iron
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ore mined and prepared for use, manufactured slate and canal
boats, are valid when properly recorded: but unless renewed, the
time lasts but one year.
In New Hampshire the rule laid down in the federal courts and
declared in Coburn v. Pickering,3 N. H. 415, still prevails, and
Coburn v. Pickeringhas been supported by numerous subsequent
decisions, to the effect that when the secret trust has been established, the fraud ipso facto follows, as a conclusion of law, without
regard to the intention of the parties: Coolidge v. .Melvin, 42 N.
H. 510; S%aw v. Thomp8on, 43 Id. 130; Lang v. Stockwell, 55

Id. 561 ; Cutting v. Jackson, 56 Id. 253 (1875). The act requiring a chattel mortgage to be recorded is still in force, and when
there is a retention of possession without recording'it, is void in
law: Piper v. Hillard, 52 N. H. 209; Putnam v. Osgood, 51
Id. 192; and where there is an agreement that the mortgagor may
sell the goods for his own benefit, such a secret trust will render
the mortgage void, even though entered into after the mortgage
has been completed; but possession by the mortgagee will answer
instead of recording: Janvrinv. Fogg, 49 N. H. 340.
(2.) The second class into which we have divided the cases comprises the larger number of the state courts, in 'which it is the
rule that the question of fraud is one of fact for the jury; and,
although the retention of possession raises a presumption of fraud,
it may be rebutted by proof of the bona fides of the parties.
In Alabama, in Mayer v. Clark, 40 Ala. 259 (1866), BYiD, J.,
held that, "Where the possession of a chattel remains with the
vendor, it is, as to creditors, a badge of fraud simply and not fraud
per se: robb8 v. Bibb, 2 Stew.54. 336; 5 Ala. 531, 780; 14 Id.
814; 24 Id. 219. Possession remaining with the vendor, unexplained, is primafacie evidence of fraud, and if consistent with good
faith and the absolute disposition of property, and the transaction is
bona fide throughout, then the title passes by the contract of sale,
notwithstanding the possession remains with the vendor: Millard's
Adm'rs v..all, 24 Ala. 219. * * * The true rule would seem to be
that possession of personal property after a sale remaining with
the vendor, is a badge of fraud, which, if unexplained, would be
sufficient to authorize a verdict against the vendee. But if explained, as required in the case of the Bank v. Borland, 5 Ala.
539, then the title of the vendee will not be affected by the posVyatt v. Stewart, 34 Ala. 721 (1859),
session of the vendor."
held "that the retention of possession after the sale by a maker
Vo.
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of a deed of ftust of property sold upon notice at public outcry by
the trustee, is not prima facie evidence of fraud: Montgomery v.
Kirksey, 26 Ala. 172 ; Maulden & Terrell v. Mllitchell, 14 Id. 814."
SAFFOLD, J., said, in Moog v. Benedioks, 49 Ala. 512 (1873),
that it was error to charge that a vendor's remaining in possession
of the goods and selling them as before, was such a badge of fraud
as could only be overcome by proof of compensation paid to him as
the vendee's agent. "If he acted without reward it would only
have been a circumstance indicative of fraud, but not inconsistent
with good intention." And see Crawford et al. v. Kirksey et al.,
55 Id. 282.
Arkansas. Possession by the vendor after the sale, if connected
with explanatory facts, is not sufficient to sustain a charge of fraud;
and it was even held error to introduce evidence to affect the bill
of sale, or to show that the transaction it witnessed was anything
else than the bill of sale recited: George v. Zorris, 28 Ark. 121
(1861). Where from the character or situation of the property,
actual delivery is impossible, a constructive delivery will suffile:
-Puckettv. 1?eed, 31 Id. 131; Trieber v. Andrews, Id. 163.
Indiana. The Statute of Frauds expressly declares that the
question of fraudulent intent shall be one for the jury. "If there
was not an actual, visible and continuous change of possession, the
transaction was primafacie fraudulent, but upon that point * * *
the question of fraudulent intent was for the jury :" .Nutter v.
Harris, 9 Ind. 91; Kane v. Drake, 27 Id. 29. But where the
instrument evidencing the sale or mortgage is on its face fraudulent,
the court may declare it so without referring to the jury: Jenners
v. Doe, 9 Ind. 461. Relied on in Bobinson v. Elliott, 22 Wall. 522
(1866). "The retention by the vendor of the possession is prima
facie evidence of fraud, and throws on the party who would sustain
the sale, the burden of rebutting the presumption of fraud arising
from such continued possession by the vendor, and in the absence
of such explanatory proof, fraud is inferred from the fact that the
vendor retains the possession, and it was proper that the court
should so charge the jury :" Kane v. Drake, supra.
Louisiana is not cited in the note to Twj/ne's Case. The Code
provides, art. 1916, "If the vendor, being in possession, should
by a second contract, transfer the property to another person, who
gets the possession before the first obligee, the last transferee is
considered as the proprietor, provided the contract be made on his
part bona fide and without notice of the former contract." Art.
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1917, "If personal property be transferred by contract, but not
delivered, it is liable in the hands of the obligor" (vendor) "to
seizure and attachment in behalf of his creditors." Other parts of
the code define what is possession, and in McOloskey v. Central
Bank of Alabama, 16 La. Ann. 284, these sections are construed
in connection with art. 2456 0. C., in which it is said that, "In all
cases where the thing sold remains in the possession of the seller
because he has reserved to himself the usufruct or retains possession by a precarious title, there is reason to presume that the sale
is simulated, and with respect to third persons, the parties must produce proof that they are acting in good faith and establish the
reality of the sale. It was held that while the failure of the vendee to take possession might, under the terms of the last clause, be
explained, a failure to show the title of the vendee in any way
would be within the terms of the preceding sections, and that such
a sale was void as against an execution. See, also, Jordav. Lewis, 1
La. Ann. 59; MeCandlishv. Kirkland,7 Id. 614; Zachariev. Kirk,
14 Id: 433. It seems therefore that the distinction drawn is between
those cases in which the vendor is allowed to remain in possession
under a contract or by a precarious title, and those in *which he is
allowed to remain by mere neglect. In the former cases, the fact
is op3n to explanation, in the latter the presumption cannot be
rebutted by proof of good faith. The presumption raised by art.
2456 0. C. must be rebutted by strong evidence: Bernard v. Auguste, 6 La. Ann. 24; Nichols v. Botts, 6 Id. 437; Keller v.Blanchard, 19 Id. 53; Sullice v. -radenigo,15 Id. 582. But
bona fides and transfer of possession may be shown, sufficient to
repel the presumption: Miltenberqjer v. Parker,17 Id. 254.
In Massachusetts, no change has taken place in the rule that the
retention of possession is merely evidence of fraud for the jury:
Ingall v. Hlerriek, 108 Mass. 351 (1871), where a number of
cases are cited.
In Maine, it is the province of the court to say what is delivery
sufficient to constitute a good sale: Bethel Steam Mill Co. v. Brown
et al., 57 Me. 9; FairfieldBridge Co. v. Nye, 60 Id. 372; Afo8her

v. Smith, 67 Id. 172. In the case of a sale by a husband to his
wife, although no actual fraud was alleged, it was held that there
should have been some formal delivery to evidence the change of
title: McKee v. Garcelon, 60 Id. 165. But in Googins v. Gilmore,

47 Id. 9, the lower court was affirmed in its refusal to enter a nonsuit in the case of a mortgage of perishable property, in which it
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was agreed that the mortgagor should remain in possession, and it
was held to be a question for the jury: see also Emmons v. Bradley, 56 Id. 333, in which it is said, quoting from the opinion in
New England Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass. 279, "in the case
of a bill of sale or other conveyance of property apparently absolute, proof of any secret trust or agreement inconsistent with the
tenor of the agreement [conveyance] is undoubtedly evidence of a
fraudulent bargain :made for the purpose of defeating or delaying
creditors. This is mentioned in Twyne's Case as one of the
badges of fraud. But it is not fraud in itself or conclusive evidence of fraud." Conversely a sale and delivery with a secret
stipulation that the title shall not vest until payment of the purchase-money is void. against attaching creditors of the vendee:
Boynton v. .Abbey, 62 Me. 253.
In Michigan it has been frequently held and asserted that the
statute changed the old rule, and made the question of fraud always
one for the jury: Jacksonv. Dean, 1 Doug. 519 ; Braggv. Jerome,
7 Mich. 145; Gay v. Bidwell, Id. 519. But in Hatch v. Fowler,
28 Id. 205 (1873), it was held to be error to have refused to charge
the jury that in the case of retention of possession, "such sale
would be deemed fraudulent and void as against the creditors,"
upon the ground that, by this rule, the jury were to determine
whether sufficient had been shown to rebut such a presumption,
and that, as a rule of evidence for the jury, it held good. A
chattel mortgage recorded in accordance with the statute, is valid:
People v. Bristol, 35 Mich. 28.

The Minnesota Statutes at Large 692, § 15, provide that retention of possession shall be deemed fraudulent and void, "unless
those claiming under such sale or assignment make it appear that
the same was made in good faith and without any intent to hinder,
delay or defraud such creditors or purchasers," which seems to
make the question clearly one for the jury: Blackman v. Wheaton,
13 Minn. 326 (1868).
In Mississippi, Comstock v. Raeford, 20 Miss. 369, seems to
have been decided upon the principle that retention of possession
was only primafacie evidence of fraud, and the onus probandi is

thrown upon the vendee: Carterv. Graves, 6 How. 9, and Bankin
v. Eolloway, 3 S. &M. 614. I the case of public forced sales, fraud
is purely a question of fact, and it was held error, in such a case,
to instruct the jury that if there was not such an exclusive possession by the vendee the sale was "collusive and fraudulent, ***
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unless satisfactorily explained :" Garlandv. Chambers, 11 S. & N.
337, and Ewing v. Cargill, U[ Id. 79. Recording a mortgage is
equivalent to an actual delivery: Hundley v. Buckner, 6 Id. 70.
But retention of possession is not per se fraudulent: Hilliard v.
Cagle, 46 Miss. 309. Nor is a conditional sale: Ketchum . Cummins v. Brennan, 53 Id. 594.
New York. In New York the current of the later cases in the
Court of Appeals seems to have been pretty definitely settled in
the course given to it by Hanford v. Artcher, 4 Hill 272, by the
old Court of Errors; and even the Supreme Court, with whom the
disagreement was at first so great after the passage of the Revised
Statutes in 1830, seems to have acquiesced in the rule, that although
retention of possession is presumptive evidence of fraud, it is nevertheless a question for the jury, and not the judge, to decide. In
Mathews v. Poultney, 83 Barb. 127 (1860), the facts, as found by
the judge before whom an action to set aside an assignment was
tried at special term, were that the assignor of the stock, &c., of a
grocery store was allowed to remain in possession; that he conducted the business for the assignee, without any compensation;
that the sign over the store remained as before in the name of the
assignee, and that there were various other circumstances, which,
unexplained, would have been conclusive evidence of fraud; but,
upon the weight of all the evidence, "the justice was unable to
discover any actual fraud." On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
court say: "Taking possession of the assigned property, an actual
and continued change of the possession and all analogous facts, are
but facts, the absence of which shows or tends to show a fraudulent
intent in the making of the assignment And the evidence as to
such facts, like that which may be offered as to facts prior to, and
immediately connected with, the making of the assignment, is left
for both its credibility and its weight to the tribunal (whether judge
or jury) which tries the questions of fact;" cited approvingly in
Juliand v. Rathbone, 39 Barb. 102. In the Superior Court, in
Stewart v. Slater, 6 Duer 83, "the paramount and controlling
authority" of Hanford v. Arther, was adverted to. Fide Champlin v. Johnson, 39 Barb. 608; Johnson v. Curtis, 42 Id. 588,
and Spicer v. Waters, 65 Id. 233 (1866). And the Court of Appeals, although originally not decidedly affirming Hard v. Anfrotcher, follows the same line of authority, and regards the intent as
the only real ground for holding retention of possession to be fraud.
Ball v. Loomis, 29 N. Y. 415 (1864) : "Such facts are presump-
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tive evidence of fraud and conclusive, unless rebutted by affirmative
evidence of good faith and the absence of an intent to defraud."
Mitchell v. West, 55 N. Y. 107 (1873), was an action for the
alleged conversion of personal property. The property was left
after the sale in the vendor's possession and -was levied upon by virtue of a writ of execution against the vendor by the defendant.
Upon the trial the court was asked to charge that it was the duty
of the vendee (the plaintiff) to give some reason, which the court
could approve, for his allowing the goods to remain in the vendor's
possession, which the court refused. On appeal, RAPALLO, J.,
said, "1The principal point urged on the part of the appellant is,
that in addition to proof that the sale of the chattels was bona fide,
and that there was no intent to defraud the creditors of the vendor,
it was necessary to show some valid excuse or reason for leaving
the property in his possession; or stated in another form, that the
absence of intent to defraud creditors cannotbe established without
showing a good reason for the want of change of possession. We
regard this point as settled by the decision of the Court of Errors in
Ranford v. Artcher,4 Hill 271." To the same effect see May
v. Walter, 56 N. Y. 8, and Ti7son v. Terwziliger, Id. 273. In
May v. Walter, indeed, the case was referred back to the jury,
overruling the charge of the court below, that evidence of a fair
price having been paid was sufficient to establish the bona fide8.
New Jersey seems to have been singularly free from cases involving this point since 1866, but Runyon v. Groslwn, cited in the
note to Twyne's Case, is re-affirmed in Parr v. Brady, 8 Vroom
(37 N. J.) 201. After referring to bona fide purchasers as affected
by chattel mortgages, BEDLE, J., says, "In favor of the latter,"
(bona fide purchasers) "the only judicial question has been
whether, if there is no change in the possession of the property,
that fact is to be considered as lprima facie evidence of fraud. That,
however, is only a matter of evidence, and does not affect the validity of the instrument if there is no fraud. The possession can
always be explained. Assuming our common-law rule to be as held
in Runyon v. Groshon, 1 Beasley 87, the. New Jersey Statute of
Frauds*provides for the recording of chattel mortgages 'unaccompanied by immediate delivery and actual and continued change of
possession,' and makes void as against creditors those not recorded.
North Carolina still belongs to this class, as the rule was originally laid down in Rea v. Alexander, 5 Ired. 644. At least no
subsequent case seems to have overruled or doubted it.
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In Ohio, Collins 4- McElroy v. Myers, 16 Ohio 547, cited in the
note to Twyne's Case, to hold "that a continuance of possession,
with a power of disposition and sale on the part of the mortgagor,
either expressed or implied, is necessarily fraudulent and void as
against creditors, as such a mortgage is no security to the mortgagor
and of no effect but to ward off other creditors," has been explained
in Kleine, Hegger " Co. v. Katze:-berger & Co., 20 Id. 110, to
mean that it is the power of disposition retained by the mortgagor
"for the mortgagor'sown benefit," and where "the power of sale is
such as to leave in the mortgagor a dominion over the property, inconsistent with the alleged lien of the mortgage that the latter has
been held per se fraudulent and void." But where the mortgagor
merely acts as agent for the mortgagee it is for the jury to determine
the bona fides of such an arrangement: Ib. Nor will the acquiescence by the mortgagee in a subsequent sale of the mortgaged property render the mortgage voij, unless at the time the mortgage
was given such an understanding existed: Clark v. Morris,2 Am.
Law Record 364.
In Rhode Island it was held not to be error to instruct the jury
that a bill of sale of a farm and utensils made by an insolvent to a
relative, where possession was retained by the vendor and his family,
was primafacie evidence of fraud. In the opinion in the Supreme
Court, BULLOCK, J., said that there could be no doubt that the facts
as above stated "when proved, tend to show such sale merely colorable, not conclusive of course, but circumstances proper for. the
jury to weigh, and from which, in the absence of explanatory evidence, they may infer that such sale is in fact fraudulent :" Sarle
Arnold, 7 R. I. 582; certainly not a very harsh rule of evidence
when the circumstances of that case are considered.
In Texas, OGDEN, P. J., said (Thornton v. Smith, 89 Tex. 544):
"If it be admitted that the assignor retained possession or concurrent possession with one of the assignees, still this would be at most
only a badge of fraud, susceptible of explanation, and which we
think was fully explained by the testimony in harmony with the
claim of a bona fide transaction."
Wisconsin. The statute of this state bas been pretty strictly
enforced, by requiring such an "1actual" change of possession as
the statute contemplates, in order to rebut the presumption of
fraud. It means such a change, tha. the vendor ceases to possess
the goods in any capacity whatever: Grant v. Lewis, 14 Wis. 187.
In Osen v. Bherman, 27 Wis. 505 (1871), LYoN, J., said, "The
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portions of the general charge to which exceptions were taken, are
to the effect that, if, after the sale by Lang to the plaintiff, they
held possession of the property conjointly, or if Lang continued
in possession thereof as the agent of the plaintiff, or if the plaintiff permitted Lang to remain in possession thereof and control
the business, the presumption of fraud attached, and the burden
was upon the plaintiff to remove such presumption by evidence.
We think that the circuit judge stated the law in that behalf
correctly to the jury ;. for how can it be said that there is 'an
actual and continued change of possession' from the vendor to
the purchaser of the thing sold, if such vendor still has dominion
over it, either conjointly with the purchaser, or as his agent, or the
manager of his business ? We find no error in the charge of the
court."
But "there may undoubtedly be an honest sale, and the vendor
left in possession in good faith as the vendee's agent. But it looks
so much the other way, on the face of it, without explanation, that
the statute makes the mere fact of the continued possession of the
vendor presumptive evidence of fraud, and conclusive, unless the
purchaser shows, by satisfactory evidence, that there was really no
intent to defraud, that burden being thrown upon him." PAINME, J.,
in Grant v. Lewis.
Nearly all of the decisions upon the question in which it has
been theoretically discussed in the Supreme Court have arisen on
appeal from the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia; and
where this has not been the case, under these last decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, the laws of the respective states
were held to govern. Allen v. Massey, 16 Wall. 851, an appeal
from the Circuit Court of Missouri, was a case in which the parties
to the transaction lived in the same house. A sale of household
furniture was made by one to the other, both using the furniture
alike, and exactly as before. The assignee in bankruptcy of the
vendor having filed a bill to have the sale annulled, the District
Court of Mistouri rendered a decree to that effect; this decree was
affirmed by the Circuit Court and the defendants appealed. Mr.
Justice FIELD, delivering the opinion, said: "The sale was within
the terms of the statute fraudulent and void as against Downing's
creditors. * * * In the case of Claflin v. Rosenberg, 42 Mo.
439, where the vender had become clerk of the purchaser, the
Supreme Court of Missouri held that the possession which the
purchaser was required to take of the property sold, in order to

